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*Lisbon Revolution's 1st Year***Spino's Intrigues Strengthen Leftist Officers**

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LISBON, April 24—One year ago tonight's a military coup was launched against the right-wing dictatorship that had ruled Portugal for nearly five decades.

To reassure the country's capitalists and NATO allies the victorious Armed Forces Movement elected Gen. Antonio de Spino's, 64, a monocled conservative, to become their leader.

Even though Spino's had told the rebellion's leader that an uprising in Lisbon would never succeed, the general almost at once assumed the mantle of "father" of the revolution and began to run the show according to his own lights. A hero in the unpopular African colonial wars given to surprising political turnabouts and an admiration for Charles de Gaulle and Mao Tse-tung, Spino's stunned left wing officers by insisting that Communists be named to the first provisional government.

The general wanted the Communists out in the open where they could be watched. He also thought he could control them, and, if necessary, force them out of the government. Spino's had gone to Premier Marcelo Caetano, the uncertain leader of the dictatorship, several weeks before the coup, and urged him to resign. Caetano had agreed, but the right wing government's president, Americo Tomas, got wind of the deal and blocked it.

There are indications that Spino's had been acting in concert with the United States and other Portuguese NATO allies in a move to dump the dictatorship and preserve the African empire through a federation of the colonies with Portugal, a plan that the general had outlined in a book called Portugal and the future.

After the old government's right-wing leaders upset Spino's plan, which had the approval of the Armed Forces Movement, he tried to trigger a revolt

on March 16, 1874. The uprising failed when a number of units controlled by the leader of the Armed Forces Movement's coordinating committee refused to participate.

The Spino's faction of the Armed Forces Movement ended up in jail, and the general was reduced to making minor contributions to the movement's political program and to suggesting that a coup should be attempted in Guinea-Bissau, his old domain, because Portugal was too closely controlled by the dictatorship.

With this history of competition, it was not surprising that once in power Spino's tried to smash the coordinating committee. The general and the committee clashed repeatedly over colonial policy. The committee wanted independence for the colonies as soon as possible. Spino's argued for federation, for self-determination by referendum, for any formula short of immediate freedom.

He made his final bid in July, but the committee beat him back, and forced him to name as premier the movement's political theoretician, Vasco de Gonalves.

By this time, Gen. Francisco da Costa Gomes, now president, was moving in the background to gain control of the armed forces. He rammed through a decree excluding Spino's and Gonalves from command of the troops, and began to consolidate his power and restructure the services.

Spino's, however, was seeking American support. He talked to President Nixon in the Azores, a conversation which remains classified to this day. He also attempted to motivate a coup by raising the specter of growing Communist power—which he had helped create by giving the Communists two Cabinet posts and the patronage and political leverage that they brought with them.

Not only were the Communists entrenched, but the

Armed Forces Movement was moving to the left in the face of Spino's overt moves to seize power and dismantle not only the revolution but plans to free the colonies.

To assess the situation, Kissinger sent Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to Lisbon. He spoke to Spino's and to Costa Gomes in August.

The following month, Spino's tried another tack. Supported by a number of conservative officers, some of whom had held power in the dictatorship, he gave approval to a "silent majority" demonstration planned for late September. The premier and the Armed Forces Movement's leadership urged him to disown the rally. The showdown ended with Spino's resignation when Gen. Costa Gomes, in control of the armed forces, refused to back him.

In a rage, Spino's reportedly threatened to telephone then-President Nixon, who was having impeachment problems, to send the Marines to stop Portugal's race toward Communism and Soviet control.

After a farewell speech warning against a Communist dictatorship, the general retired to a farm in a Lisbon suburb. Some of his moderate followers were contacted by aides of Socialist leader Mario Soares, who sought a political deal with the flamboyant General. The Socialists had discovered that they were making no inroads of the left and wanted the general's support to win votes and adherents on the right.

Soares and his brain trust calculated that if the general kept out of mischief and kept his mouth shut until after this month's elections for a constituent assembly, they had it made. In turn, the Socialists would back Spino's for the presidency. The general agreed to the arrangement and announced that he was a Socialist. Soares began to campaign for rightist votes, re-

erating the general's warning about a Communist takeover, but adding that civil war and invasion were possible if the Communists took over.

It was a dangerous game which required that Spino's sit on his hands. But it wasn't long before the general was plotting again.

Because of the climate of fear and uncertainty created by Soares's warnings and international concern caused by stories of Soviet designs on Portuguese ports leaked by Socialists in the Foreign Ministry, Spino's got the impression he could have another go at taking over. By now he was dealing with extreme rightists. On March 11, after weeks of tension, the general tried still another coup. It failed, and in the process he did untold damage to Soares and the Socialists.

His action led the Armed Forces Movement to take over completely, nationalizing industries which in effect had been monopolies granted to a few by the dictatorship, and put the Communists and the Soviet Union in a most favorable position.

For reasons still to be explained, Spino's timed his move to coincide with the

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